

by Community's Foreign Ministers as they did not consider Morocco to be a European country⁽³⁾. The rejection was expected as the late Moroccan King, Hassan II, had sent messengers two years before, who received such as response expressed at the beginning by French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Claude Cheysson; the main reason for the rejection was that Morocco was not geographically part of Europe and also because, at that time, the socialist French government wanted to set a more balanced relationships between France, Morocco and Algeria, with respect to the Sahara conflict.

Since then, the successive Moroccan governments didn't cease requesting from Europeans an "advanced status" which would be situated at a higher level than a simple "association". King Mohammed VI, who took power in July 1999, launched another call⁽⁴⁾ for a stronger and deeper partnership between Morocco and the EU. He proposed this partnership to be at "a level ranging between association and pure and simple union". Something similar was advanced a few years before by the former president of the European commission, Romano Prodi, "All except the institutions".

The efforts undertaken by the Moroccan authorities to meet European expectations in terms of reducing the crossing of migrants from Morocco – and all the north-western part of Africa over to Europe – seem to have borne fruit as of end of 2005 beginning of 2006⁽⁵⁾.

(3) This element can be counterattacked when one know that Ceuta and Melilla, which are considered by EU as European cities, are situated at the North of Morocco, somewhere in Africa, out of Europe.-

(4) From Paris, France, on March 2000. See Afkar (Ideas), Spanish revue – IEMed – Barcelona, June 2007.

(5) This is probably also due to the entry into force of the SIVE – the system Spain established since 2002 in the south of the Iberian peninsula and then off the Canary Islands, close to Morocco but also to Mauritania and Senegal - and the means implemented by the Frontex Agency, established in October 2004, to help protect the external borders in the southern part of Europe.

Given its geographical location, being separated from Europe by only 14 km, and because of its own economic and social deficits, Morocco is in fact situated in the outposts of the migratory question, regarding its proper migrants and also Subsaharan migrants. This way, Moroccans settled in a position of relative comfort compared to previous years with a decreasing number of migrants since 2005.

Indeed, the shift of migration routes further south of its borders, to Mauritania and Senegal more specifically, implies several remarks:

- The strategy Morocco followed, and its active partnership with Spain, and in fact with all Europe, made the transit through its territory extremely difficult, both through the Mediterranean Sea or the South Atlantic waters.
- This led obviously to a decrease in the attempts to cross Morocco and, therefore, in the number of migrants on Moroccan territory. Morocco is no longer playing the role of a transit place for migrants on their way to Europe. Hence the number of irregular migrants in Morocco does not exceed more 10.000 people, as of 2007.

Regarding these various elements, it seems that Morocco opted for a migration policy totally in line with the European approach "of outsourcing the management of migration flows". Similarly, Morocco gradually improved its political and diplomatic position vis-à-vis of the EU.

Moroccan authorities could proceed to a stronger rapprochement with Spain, France and the European Union in general, explaining in particular that Morocco was "victim of its geographical position" and that the migrants were only on its territory on their way to Europe. This resulted, in particular, in a great convergence of views between Moroccan and Spanish officials, whose common interests vis-à-vis the other EU countries, Algeria and sub-Saharan countries of departure, were increasingly emphasized, at least more than before: the attempts to force passage to the cities of Ceuta and Melilla in autumn 2005 and even compared to the climate of animosity that prevailed in the relations between Morocco and Spain, especially between summer 2001 and the end of 2002.

Barcelona process: a global approach of the vicinity

It will be difficult to reconsider the social, political and economic consequences for Morocco of the various agreements of association which it signed with the EU since 1969, of which in particular the agreement on the institution of the Free Trade Zone (FTZ) signed in 1996 and which came into effect in 2000.

But as Morocco was an important actor in the process of Barcelona, it would be useful to present some ideas about the results reached overall. Additionally, since Morocco is of course concerned with the project of the new Union for the Mediterranean, it would be useful to provide some general comments on this new "Union", whose structures were set up in November 2008⁽⁶⁾.

After that, Morocco obtained⁽⁷⁾ an advanced statute with regard to the EU, which it has been seeking for many years. Also, we devote on this subject a short paragraph in this text.

The main objectives and the assessment of Barcelona process:

Signed at the end of 1995 in Barcelona, this process had three principal objectives:

- to create between the North and the South of the Mediterranean countries a shared area of prosperity and co-development, as a means to reduce the economic gap between those countries by increasing the inter-Mediterranean commercial and financial exchanges and, thus, diminishing the will of an important part of the youth in the south to migrate (irregularly!) to the north.
- the second objective was to build a balanced and mutually profitable political, social and cultural dialogue between the countries from both sides of the Mediterranean.

(6) Following a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the country constituting the Union for the Mediterranean (held in Marseille at the beginning of November 2008) Barcelona was indicated to be the seat of the General secretary of the Union.

(7) That was done and announced in Brussels on October 13, 2008.

- the third objective was to constitute a space of security and stability between north and south parts of the Mediterranean, mainly by resolving the Palestinian conflict and by reducing irregular migration flows.

During the Euro-Mediterranean summit held in Barcelona in 2005 – with the presence of only one President from all the Arabic countries – the hope of building a co-prosperity space appeared as a myth.

And even if the process of Barcelona allowed a relative reinforcement of the civil society in countries like Morocco or Jordan, the cultural and social dialogue between the north and the south of the Mediterranean has not really advanced. This dialogue even seemed to go completely contrary to what was hoped for. The scandal of "Danish caricatures" (even if Denmark is not a part of the Barcelona process) and the reactions which they caused in the Arab world, in particular in a country like Libya, showed that there was a lack of dialogue indeed.

The political dialogue remained blocked because of the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, and, to a certain extent, because of the second war against⁽⁸⁾ Iraq and the American war against terrorism, which escalated since September 2001.

In all cases, and mainly for searchers civil society actors in the southern Mediterranean, the assessment of the results achieved within the framework of the Barcelona process and all the euro-med relationships seemed ambivalent.

On the European side, there is focus on:

- Closer relations with the American administration, which opposes the interests of the Arab world, mainly concerning the Palestinian and Iraqi questions.

(8) Where important European countries, like Britain, Spain or Portugal were engaged since the beginning.

- The dominance of strictly European concerns such as fighting illegal migration or terrorism, energy issues (supply and cost) and also the penetration of the Arab markets by the EU companies.
- The return of religion in the political discourse, thus providing arguments to those who, on both sides of the Mediterranean, advocate a war of "civilizations".

On the other hand, among the countries of the southern Mediterranean, many observers and politicians can still note:

- That the lack of democracy and rule of law is still characterizing practically all the southern Mediterranean countries;
- The absence, till now, of a coherent and /or complementary economic and social policy in and between these countries. This issue is still appearing as not urgent for almost all governments in the south. Security and stability seem to be, till now say, more urgent.
- The weakness of Intra-Med and the south-south intra-trade, mainly for political reasons, such as the conflict between Morocco and Algeria, that led to the closure of borders⁽⁹⁾.
- No progress has been made in the south regarding "region-building". Until now, no political or economic regional institutions are in force, even the so-called Arabic Maghreb Union, which was proclaimed in Marrakesh in 1989.
- As a consequence of the absence of democracy, the disrespect of the public opinion and the social and economic situation of which most of the population suffers, there is a continuous rise of political and religious radicalism whose elements feed violence and terrorism, not only against Europe but also against south countries.

(9) The land borders between Morocco and Algeria are officially closed since July 1994. But, in the facts, through this border much traffickers of goods of all kinds and migrants operate (one estimates that 90% of the irregular migrants living in Morocco come starting from its border with Algeria).

On another level, one can also mention that :

- The deficits between Europe and Africa are accentuated, as a direct consequence owing to the fact that the discrepancy of development keeps growing between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa
- Africa is still increasingly vulnerable to the crises: food, energy, political, and environmental crises.
- The propensity to migrate has never been so strong, mainly in countries like Morocco, Algeria and Sub-Saharan Africa.

The facts above, of course, strongly correlate with the paramount importance of immigration from Africa and the Middle East to Europe.

The States of the North and the South of the Mediterranean should have taken the necessary time to analyze the reasons for the great gap between the declared objectives of the Barcelona process and the results to which it led. This was not done, and for some the cause is to be found mainly in the Arabic-Israeli conflict.

Nobody has, for example, evoked the disproportion between the objectives retained in Barcelona and the institutional and financial means mobilized to achieve these objectives.

The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)

According to Henri Guaino, French president adviser (July 2009)⁽¹⁰⁾, "Barcelona was designed by Europe like an instrument to dialogue with the South. For the first time since the decolonization, Europe showed its interest for the South. But, in Barcelona, there was an imbalance to the benefit of the North. Barcelona process was the property of Europe which spoke to the South, offered its assistance and sometimes gave lessons to the South. The Union for the Mediterranean wants to be a joint ownership, a partnership on the basis of equal rights and duties to assume together their common destiny which is called the Mediterranean.

(10) Interview with French newspaper "Le Monde". www.lemonde.fr

The change from "of" to "for" was imposed by the German "chancellor", Angela Merkel, and it means that, "we, Europeans, we don't constitute a Union with the countries of the southern bank of the Mediterranean, but we only will work with those on some projects concerning the Mediterranean"⁽¹¹⁾.

While bringing back this proposal to what was the deep thought of the French president⁽¹²⁾, neutral non European observers especially think that it had three essential, internal and external, political objectives:

- The proposal for a Mediterranean Union was to be used as an alternative to Turkey to dissuade it from maintaining its application to join the European Union; Nicolas Sarkozy did not want Turkey as a candidate and does not want any more as a president. In a presidential campaign speech at Toulon (in February 2007), he decided that Turkey is not a European country and as so, It cannot be member of the EU: *"It's from the point of view of this Mediterranean Union that we should consider the relations between Europe and Turkey. Because Europe cannot extend indefinitely. Europe if it wants to have an identity must have borders and, thus, limits. Europe if it wants to have a power cannot be diluted unceasingly. Europe if it wants to be able to function cannot widen without stop. Turkey doesn't have its place in the European Union because it's not a European country.... I want to be the friend of Turkey but I say that Turkey does not have its place in Europe because it's in minor Asia"*⁽¹³⁾.

- "The return of France in Europe" appears initially, and quite naturally, like a will of assertion of the role and weight of France among especially the countries of the south of the EU and those of the south of the Mediterranean.

(11) Projects such as water, energy, transport, "depollution" of the Mediterranean, etc...

(12) When he made such proposal on February 2007 (during the French presidential campaign).

(13) Because Turkey is situated between Asia and Europe, it is regarded as a country located out of Europe.

- It is probably that which was at the origin of the visits carried out by the French president to the Maghreb in July 2007 (the day before the festivities of July 14), and in October 2007 to Morocco, and in Algeria (in November of the same year) before receiving the Libyan president for a "long week" in France (at the beginning of December 2007)..

Thus, The French president argued on December 2007, in the presence of Angela Merkel, that the Mediterranean Union would be a "common space" of "common management" of the "selected migration" (element which didn't appear during the French presidential election, on February 7, 2007) and went even further in the same vein as the position of Germany while supporting, on January 30, 2008: "The development of a European pact of immigration will be one of the priorities of the French presidency of the European Union" as was declared by Nicolas Sarkozy, who invited Germany to work "hand in the hand"⁽¹⁴⁾ with France during this period.

The European Pact on migration (EPoM) main objectives

One week before the proclamation of the creation of the Union for the Mediterranean in Paris, on July 13, 2008, the 27 EU Interior Ministers finalized, in the French city of Cannes, the text of what would become the European pact of immigration⁽¹⁵⁾.

This pact has five declared targets, the most important of which seems to be the control of the irregular migration. These targets can be resumed as follow :

- a/ To organize legal immigration: according to the promoters of the project, the needs of the legal migrants should be taken into account, as well as the priorities and the capacities of receiving countries, and the integration of migrants is to be supported by Member State. Thus, the pact invites the 27 countries of the Union to develop professional immigration

(14) www.LePoint.fr / Reuters. January 30, 2008.

(15) Which will be adopted by the European Council on October 17, 2008.

and to reinforce the attractiveness of the EU for the high qualified workers. As regards employment, the "Community preference" will have to be respected. Lastly, before accommodating immigrants, the Member States will have to make sure that the latter have necessary incomes to settle in the host countries and to be integrated.

b/ To fight against illegal immigration: the objective is to ensure the return of the foreigners in irregular situation to their countries of origin⁽¹⁶⁾. Thus, EU will have to coordinate their actions and to give up the "general regularizations".⁽¹⁷⁾ In addition, readmission agreements will be concluded "with the countries concerned".

c/ To reinforce the effectiveness of the frontier checks/controls: accordingly, France asked its European partners to commit themselves generalizing the delivery of biometric visas at the latest on January 1, 2012 and to reinforce the capacities of the Frontex agency⁽¹⁸⁾, charged with coordinating the action of the police forces at the European south borders.

d/ To build "Europe of asylum": as from 2009, an office whose mission will be to facilitate the exchanges of information will be set up. The Commission is in addition invited to formulate proposals in order to found in 2012 a "procedure of single asylum" and to adopt "uniform statutes of refugees".

e/ To stress co-development: the European Council commits itself to support the development of the countries concerned and build with them a narrow partnership to support "synergies between migrants" and the harmonious development of the countries of origin.

EPoM, some preliminary comments

Representing in the content and the form a fundamental contradiction compared to the declared philosophy of the Union for the Mediterranean⁽¹⁹⁾ or, more generally, of the total principles at the origin of the agreements for the institution of Zones of free trade (FTA) signed since the years 1990 with many countries of the south, of which those of the Maghreb. The drafting of this pact allows a certain number of comments, of which the principal following:

1/ This pact very clearly carries the seal of the former Interior Minister and the French president; it's strongly tinted with "security ideology" and is based on a one-dimensional approach, where, for example, the negative effects on the starting countries of the migrants of the globalization and/or the FTA signed by the EU with various countries of the south are not anywhere taken into account, or at least, are not mentioned.

2/ This pact goes against the course of the history and the calls to the opening and the liberalization of economic, financial and human exchanges as it appeared within the philosophy of the origin, for example, and in conformity with the World Trade organization. Additionally, its reference to the "Community preference" is politically and ideologically dangerous, and factually erroneous. A country like France, for example, receives nearly 3 times more money transfers from its residents abroad than does Morocco from its own immigrants. What would one thus say in Europe if governments of countries like Morocco, Senegal or Egypt, start asserting a sort of "national preference", and reconsidering privatization policy, for example?⁽²⁰⁾

3/ This pact is, in the same approach, strongly unbalanced. The objective of advanced co-development like a means of reabsorbing the irregular migrations directly in the starting areas appears only for

(16) Morocco, in particular, is known at the same time like transit and starting country for irregular migrants.

(17) As that had occurred in Spain during spring 2005 or in Italy in 2002.

(18) "Frontex" for External borders agency, founded in October 2004 whose general headquarter is installed in Warsaw since then, Poland.

(19) See the declaration of H. Guaino Ci-high.

(20) According N. Sarkozy terms used in certain speeches made with the beginning of the year 2008. www.lemonde.fr

some lines in a document of 7 pages. In addition, this same objective comprises in its drafting a central contradiction since, whereas the pact as a whole would like to reduce in the absolute flows of migrations from the south towards the north, it considers migration paradoxically an instrument of development.

Thus, while at the same time Europeans explicitly request from the southern countries – especially Africans – to reduce the emigration of their citizens, they advise them to base their development policies on the resources transferred by their same migrants.

4/ The pact is founded on an extremely egotistic approach of the international relations between rich and poor countries. It would be plausible to rebalance the economic and financial relations between these countries and to provide financial incentives to the sending countries.

The place of Morocco

The EPoM as presented above indicates that the debates around the migratory question, all around the world and in Euro-Mediterranean space in particular, clearly show the weight and the sensitivity of the mobility of persons, mainly between poor and rich zones.

The migration issue is part of basically political, geo-strategic and safety problems, such as the fight against terrorism or money laundering, drug-dealing, and other types of trafficking.

However, migration – mainly in its irregular form – appears today to be one of the consequences of the social and economic policies adopted under the circumstances of globalization in the countries of the South, and one of the effects of the “selfishness” of the North.

As a result, migration is a key question in the relations between Morocco and the EU which led the latter to grant Morocco the new position known as “Advanced Status”.

Thus, within this global framework, Morocco signed one of the first agreements with the former European Economic Council (EEC) in 1969,

engaged in a free trade agreement in 1996, and implemented in 2000, and was granted an advanced status on October 13, 2008.

The New Moroccan migratory policy, the way to the “advanced status”

The explanation of the new Moroccan migration policy which started by the end of 2002 was provided in an interview of King Mohamed VI with the Spanish newspaper *El País*⁽²¹⁾, on the eve of the visit by Spain's King and Queen to Morocco between 17 and 19 January 2005.

On this occasion, the Moroccan Head of State said in particular that “There has always been a will to cope with this problem (of illegal migrations). The approach has in fact evolved in recent months. We are aware of the fact that this type of immigration represents a danger for Spain. The same also applies to Morocco, as half of the Sub-Saharan candidates for illegal emigration end up staying in Morocco, and the Spanish public opinion should know that. The various Spanish governments have always asked Morocco to grant the necessary interest to this issue. We have always done so. We indeed try to act with the maximum of efficiency. We have gone through various stages. The first consisted in increasing our staff available for this task by recruiting more forces. The second was to assess the various forces deployed with the view to achieve better coordination among them. To that end, we have set up a new Directorate at the Ministry of the Interior, exclusively in charge of fighting against illegal emigration and its related human and drug trafficking, etc...”

In the same direction, King Mohammed VI added: “It is true that we started taking measures at the level of the Straits of Gibraltar which has constituted until recently the major concern for the Spanish. Now, the migratory pressure is becoming more pronounced in the South, towards the Canary Islands. A few weeks ago, I gave instructions to make security devices in the South as impenetrable as in the North. We should work together (Spain/Morocco). For some years now, before announcing the creation in 2004 of joint patrols, the (Spanish) Guardia Civil, the

(21) *El País*, Madrid, 16 January 2005.

Moroccan Royal Gendarmerie and Royal Navy have already joined their energies. This cooperation was not made public but it generated quite encouraging results".

In the impetus of his explanations and his presentation of the results obtained about the migratory question, the king will launch another call to the EU to obtain from them more means, financial and political, and will ask Spain to be the advocate of Morocco in Europe: "We have always asked Spain and the whole of the European Union to provide us with the means necessary to combat this plague. Right now we lack them. I firmly believe that Spain is a good advocate of our cause in Europe. After all, it is the best placed country to inform on the seriousness of this issue".

The main points of the Morocco "Advanced Status" vis-à-vis of the EU:

In connection with this engagement of the king of Morocco in a subject considered by Europe as essential, the "Advanced status" appears as a political projection for Morocco. A sort of recognition of a special place allowed to that country by the 27 states of the EU.

In fact, for Morocco, the rapprochement with the EU represents – as indicated at the beginning of this text – a fundamental foreign policy choice. In that sense, The European neighbourhood policy will give an opportunity to the country to reinforce the strategic foundation of this choice through the conclusion of reciprocal undertakings and to promote the regional and sub-regional dimension, in particular in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean process.

For the Europeans, the deepening of Morocco's relationship with the European Union, which will help to identify new cooperation measures and to strengthen political ties, is a practical response that will allow Morocco to progress towards advanced partnership with Europe. This position, will be more that the "Association" but never the "Membership".

In all cases, for many European and Moroccan observers the advanced status already opens up new partnership perspectives between Morocco and the EU, among which one can quote more particularly :

- The prospect of moving beyond the existing relationship to a significant degree of integration, including offering Morocco a stake in the internal market and the possibility of participating progressively in key aspects of EU policies and programmes;
- An upgrade in the scope and intensity of political cooperation through enhanced political dialogue;
- The opportunity for convergence of economic legislation, the opening of economies to each other, and the continued reduction of trade barriers, which will stimulate investment and growth;
- An increased financial support: the EU will grant additional financial assistance to Morocco to support the implementation of all the sections of the Association Agreement and the operations identified in the Action Plan⁽²²⁾. The European Investment Bank will also help support infrastructure investment and private sector development. The Commission will be proposing a new European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which will also cover the key issue of cross-border and transnational cooperation between Morocco and the EU so as to promote integration and economic and social cohesion and lessen development gaps between regions;
- The possibility of gradually opening access to or increasing participation in certain community programmes, particularly in the areas covered by the Action Plan;
- Deepening trade and economic relations⁽²³⁾;

Before reaching this statute, whose political and especially economic results for the country will be felt only well later, Morocco obviously has – as announced above – to follow-up the European applications as regards migratory policy. Now, one can consider that Morocco had put its migratory approach in total conformity with the wills of Europe, and in all the cases with the requests of the European countries particularly Spain and France.

(22) The Action Plan identifies the principal actions and projects to be undertaken within the framework of the new advanced status obtained by Morocco.

(23) <http://www.theparliament.com>

This didn't prevent Europeans from insisting - in the document which presents the various clauses of the "Advanced status" - on the need for Morocco to have "Effective management of migration flows, including the signing of a readmission agreement with the European Community".

On this subject, the only promise which was made to him - whereas many Moroccans require freedom of circulation between Morocco and the EU as it is the case for Europeans in Morocco - is the prospect of "Facilitating the movement of persons in accordance with the gains, particularly by examining the possibilities for relaxing the formalities for certain categories of persons to obtain short-stay visas".

The maintenance of the restrictions on the circulation of Moroccans in the UE countries - in spite of the promise above to only reduce the conditions of obtaining the short-stay visas - is an element which strongly reduces for neutral observers the real political scope of the "Advanced status" of Morocco.

However, it is clear that the access to the European market and the deepening trade and economic relations between Europeans and Moroccans - if the Moroccan authorities carried out all the badly needed political, institutional, and economic reforms - would lead in two to three decades to a reduction of the gap as regards economic and social development between the two areas, which would have as an almost direct consequence the possibility of a system of circulation of people between these spaces analogous to the one which exists today between the EU and Switzerland, for example.

Conclusion

It is clear that Morocco is more interested in the reinforcement of its political relations with Europe - than the Europeans are with it - given the geopolitical difficulties in the Maghreb and in Africa, and in connection with the conflict of the Sahara.

It appears, however, quite obvious, that given the widening economic gap between Morocco and Europe, the various agreements of association

which Morocco signed until today with the EU have been insufficient to really develop its economy. This is doubtless related to the ghastly economic and social governance in Morocco, and to the absence of fundamental structural reforms in the country. But it's also related to the fact that Morocco didn't profit from its relations with Europe, as that was the case with Spain after 1986.

With the migratory questions which now mark the relations between Europe and the whole of Africa, Morocco seems a major component of the European policy. It is hoped that migration, in spite of the political difficulties that it causes with Morocco's Maghrebian neighbours and with various countries of sub-Saharan Africa, will be the element which will change the European prospect with respect to all the North Africa region, by helping this area to become - by means of continued economic and social development - more of a relay of development to the benefit of the rest of Africa, than a simple new external border of Europe.

page 11 => In the Novel, when we came to talk about Migration is generally but when we start to tell people's stories about Migration, + from struggles and suffering they face - It kind of touching the heart.
-> Miserable stories behind migrating to the Europe
-> the family separating because of it

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FROM IMMIGRATION TO MINORITY STATUS : A MOROCCAN JOURNEY TO BRITAIN

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Introduction

This article introduces the Moroccan minority in Britain. The minority has deep-rooted socio-cultural as well as socio-economic problems. These problems have an impact on the lives of the members of the minority, especially the second and subsequent generations in their quest to use and maintain their ethnic languages and culture.

Modern Moroccan immigration to Britain is relatively recent and small in size as a minority community. There is an ongoing and passionate debate about the numbers and statistics with respect to the Moroccan minority. The parties involved cannot agree on the figures for different reasons, and as a consequence the first victims of this lack of understanding are members of the Moroccan minority itself. In addition to the issue of statistics and its importance to the minority, this article looks also into the socio-economic situation of the Moroccan minority.

The article concludes by examining the issue of social exclusion and to what extent the British government standards or definition of social exclusion might apply to the Moroccan minority. To help establish this argument as objectively as possible and in the absence of reliable statistical figures on the Moroccan minority *per-se*, I shall rely on deduction and use statistical data compiled from the wards (districts) where it is known that the Moroccan minority forms a majority of the population (Jamaï, 2008).

The largest section of the Moroccan minority in Britain lives in the poorest parts of the Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea, namely the wards of Golborne, Colville and St Charles. Generally speaking, this can be seen as a representative sample of the Moroccan minority in Britain. The statistical data appears in a number of reports and studies, and presents

a bleak picture of an area and its population which are desperately in need of regeneration and integration. For political and financial reasons, these statistics appear to be conservative and reflect only part of the picture.

It seems that the biggest obstacle facing the minority is communication as, without it, access to services is almost impossible. Because of this problem of communication and also because of its cultural and religious heritage, the Moroccan minority loses out and social integration becomes an up-hill struggle. This pushes the Moroccan minority to isolation, as Rumman (1994:4) remarks:

The result of this is a community which, to a large extent, is self-contained and looks within its realms to deal with problems through mutual support.

However, mutual support and help can be interpreted as proof of solidarity within the Moroccan minority and most certainly is a positive element that must be celebrated. As regards minority's efforts to maintain its language, further encouragement, external intervention and help is the only way forward to save the Moroccan minority and others like it from a miserable existence and help it integrate into the general society.

The subject of Moroccan immigration is best presented against its historical background. This sheds light on a part of Anglo-Moroccan relations through immigration and settlement which is most neglected as there are hardly any studies concerning Moroccan immigration to Britain.

A very large number of the members of the Moroccan community are also British citizens and as such have all the rights and obligations that British law offers all citizens. From this perspective, the British-Moroccans constitute a newly established ethnic minority in Britain.

Historical background

1.1. Post-1956 immigration

The United Kingdom kept a strong presence in the Northwest of Morocco especially in Tangier and some of the surrounding towns after

Morocco's independence in 1956. This was mainly due to the close proximity of the United Kingdom to Morocco via Gibraltar. The difficult relations between Spain and the United Kingdom, and the subsequent closure of the border between Spain and Gibraltar by the Spanish ruler General Franco in 1969, witnessed the start of a major wave of the post 1956 Moroccan immigration to both Gibraltar and the United Kingdom to replace the shortage of Spanish labour force for the United Kingdom and Gibraltar job-market as a direct result of the sanctions brought about by the Spanish government of the time against Gibraltar. In addition, Moroccan immigrants were quick to take over the vacancies left by many Spaniards and Portuguese immigrants in Britain itself who preferred to return to their homeland after the establishment of democratic governments in Spain and Portugal in 1975 and their membership of the European Union in 1985.

These waves of immigration differ markedly from that preceding 1956 in the sense that the United Kingdom made those Moroccans British citizens between 1880 and 1956 on political grounds for showing loyalty to the United Kingdom and serving its interests mostly in Morocco. However, the post-1956 period witnessed a shift in the reasons for immigration, and therefore the reasons for the granting of citizenship. Economic immigration is the prime source for naturalisation of Moroccan immigrant communities in the post World War II Western Europe. These communities have shifted from being immigrant communities to minority communities in their adoptive countries (Jamai, 2008).

This matter is further emphasised with the emergence of the respective generations of such minority.

Gibraltar also played a major role acting as a springboard for Moroccan immigration to the United Kingdom. This role could be explained by two factors: First, Gibraltar played an introductory role for the Moroccan labour force to the United Kingdom labour market, which at the time was a monopoly of the ex-British colonies in the Indian sub-continent and the Caribbean among others. The second reason is that Gibraltar has a stringent law concerning residency of non-Gibraltarians on the Rock. This

law was formulated in 1889. It stipulates that only native Gibraltarians have the exclusive right to residency on the Rock that even British citizens cannot claim. Like all non-Gibraltarians, the Moroccans who found work on the Rock since 1969 can never gain full residency rights under such law and therefore will never be naturalised, resulting in the loss of many social benefits and rights one would normally gain. Many Moroccans were living in barrack-like dormitories, while others took the ferry daily from and to Tangier. (This proximity of 14 Km across the straight of Gibraltar which explains why large numbers of the Moroccan minority come from the North West of Morocco.) This situation had its negative bearing on the social as well as moral well-being of the Moroccan community. For these and other reasons, many of these workers immigrated to the United Kingdom for a better and more stable mostly economic life.

In my UK field-study (Jamaï, 2008) involving 219 respondents who were randomly selected and which I conducted between October 2000 and June 2001, the percentage of male Moroccan immigrants jumped from 7.3% in 1963 to 14.6% in 1969 – the year Spain blockaded Gibraltar – while that of female Moroccan immigrants went up from 7.3% in 1969 to 21.9% in 1971 – two years respectively after the men immigrated. This suggests family reunion once the men secured their positions and made their situation favourable for family reunion. But the wave of female immigrants in 1971 suggests more than merely members joining their spouses. Many females came to the United Kingdom in their own right – in many cases as singles – to seek their own fortune.

The large majority of these immigrants took jobs in cleaning and catering in the public sector industries such as the National Health Service and in the private sector mostly in tourism. Most of these Moroccan immigrants formed a Moroccan minority in the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea in London, and another comparatively recent one at St Albans in Hertfordshire north of London.

Establishment of the Moroccan minority

The Moroccan immigrants to Britain come largely from the north west of Morocco, an area that historically enjoys strong links with Britain. Britain is not perceived as a traditional destination for Moroccan immigration in general. This is reserved for France and Belgium, and to a lesser extent Germany, Netherlands, Italy and most recently Spain.

Moroccan immigration to Britain picked up in 1969, but it started in the late 1950s and early 1960s when Spanish agents based in London and Tetouan (a city in the north West of Morocco) started recruiting Moroccans mainly from the former occupied Spanish zone in the north of Morocco to work in the catering industry in Britain (Haousa, 1992). This first group of Moroccan immigrants, who had to pay the equivalent of £15 in 1970 and about £100 in 1973 for the work permit (Pamplin, 1993), started a chain reaction by arranging work permits for their relatives and friends in Morocco to come and work in Britain, which explains the fact that the majority of them originate from the same geographical area, the north west of Morocco. Another group of Moroccan immigrants came via Gibraltar after working there on the building of a naval base and other military installations on the Rock.

Statistics of ethnic Moroccans in Britain

It is impossible to determine how many ethnic Moroccans there are in Britain at any given time. This is due to the way censuses are organised and figures are compiled in Britain. Although all numbers must be taken with caution as they rarely reflect the strength in numbers of the Moroccan minority which I estimate to be between 35,000 and 50,000 strong. The figures from the Moroccan sources are based on consular registrations of Moroccans living in Britain. However, many immigrants do not register and therefore they do not show up in the Moroccan statistics. On the other hand, as it is discussed at some length in the following paragraphs, there is no clear provision for ethnic Moroccans to register themselves as such in the British census or the equal opportunity monitoring form.

With these provisions in mind, there were 14,590 Moroccans reported to be resident in 1991 in Britain (Naji, 1993). The largest concentration of Moroccans was in England, in particular in the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea in London with a population of 12,179 among which in the early 1990s lived approximately 620 illegal Moroccan immigrants (Naji, 1993). In Scotland, the largest concentration of Moroccans is located in the cities of Glasgow and Edinburgh, with an estimated population of 2,193 among which lived an estimated 110 illegal Moroccan immigrants (Naji, 1993). The figures of illegal immigration are highly disputed due to the very nature of illegal immigration, which is part of the underground world, therefore, without records or documentation. The 218 remainder are scattered all over the rest of the British Isles. However, according to Hassan II Association for Moroccans Abroad, the latest figures available in 1998 of Moroccans officially resident in Britain are as follows:

Table 1: Distribution of Moroccans in Britain

Males	Females	Children	Total
6 201	4 131	9 000	19 332

Source: Fondation Hassan II, 1998.

It is worth mentioning that these figures do not include illegal Moroccan immigrants to the UK. Moreover, my correspondence with the British Home Office (Ministry of Interior) led me to believe that no one knows the real statistical numbers of the members of the ethnic Moroccan minority in Britain. This is due to different factors, especially the rules that govern the census procedure in Britain, which is confusing for those who are illiterate and/or those who feel intimidated by the design of the forms they have to complete (Skali, 1998). Rumman (1994:3) remarks:

The 1991 Census was the first to include ethnic categories; however, Moroccan was not listed so respondents characterised themselves under the category they felt was most appropriate, such as White, African or Other. It has also been suggested that for a variety of reasons, such as the minority charge, immigration status and language barriers,

many Moroccans did not complete the census form. This has meant that it is not possible to identify how many Moroccans live in the Royal Borough.

Pamplin (1993:3) gives what could be considered as the clearest picture illustrating the statistical predicament of the Moroccan minority when she argues that:

Government statistics, whilst less troublesome to collate, nevertheless are problematic. Apart from the lack of statistics which are broken down into ethnic groups, official statistics tend to be variable and perhaps sometimes politically orientated. If the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea is conservative in its estimates of the number of Moroccans within the Borough, for instance, then it could possibly claim that the community is too small for specific financial aid. If however, the census figures overstate the number of Moroccan inhabitants, the community is in a more powerful position. The accuracy of census and official survey material has also been jeopardised by opposing factions within the Moroccan Community, who have argued at various times that their members should or should not fill in questionnaires for various reasons. This is in addition to the usual problems associated with the collation of questionnaires.

The establishment of the size of the Moroccan minority is crucial as a number of services provided for the benefit of minority groups depend on these statistics. This in turn affects the process of inclusion and integration in the broader society. It has been suggested that for financial as well as sometimes political reasons, many local authorities who have the statutory obligation to provide services to help integrate minority groups dispute the statistical figures and belittle them so as to avoid providing the necessary services. Smaller figures also deprive the minority group from a stronger lobbying voice to promote its interests in the local authority and agencies' decision-making process.